One of the main purposes of an index of any kind is to facilitate the extrac-tion and summary of information through an algorithmic process, e.g., averag-ing. Now typically done by computers, aver-aging is a simple example of artificial intelli-gence! Indeed, an important factor in the early popularity of the Dow Jones Industrial Average, introduced in May 1896, was the "Dow Theory," a collection of heuristics pro-posed by Charles H. Dow and later expand-ed by William P. Hamilton. In the theory, spe-cific economic meaning is attributed to certain time-series patterns in the index. ^{1}

The dream of developing automated processes for making better investment decisions obviously is not unique to our times.

But what *is *unique about our times is the confluence of breakthroughs in financial tech-nology, computer technology and institutional infrastructure that, for the first time in the his-tory of modern civilization, makes automated personalized investment management a prac-tical possibility. The combination of artificial intelligence and financial technology may one day render general market indexes obsolete: Each investor may have a "personal" index constructed specifically to meet his or her life-time objectives and risk preferences and a software agent to actively manage the portfo-lio accordingly. If this seems more like science fiction than reality, that is precisely the motiva-tion for a review of some basic recent devel-opments in artificial intelligence and their applications to financial technology.

One of the earliest and most enduring models of the behavior of security prices- and stock indexes in particular-is the Random Walk Hypothesis, an idea con-ceived in the sixteenth century as a model of games of chance. ^{2}As with so many of the ideas of modern economics, the first serious application of the Random Walk Hypothesis to financial markets can be traced to Paul Samuelson (1965), whose contribution is summarized neatly by the title of his article, "Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly." Samuelson argued that in financial markets, randomness is achieved through the active participation of many investors seeking greater wealth. An army of greedy investors trades aggressively on even the smallest informational advantages at its disposal, and in doing so, it incorporates its information into market prices and quickly eliminate the profit oppor-tunities that gave rise to its trading.

While this argument for randomness is surprisingly compelling, a number of theo-retical and empirical studies over the past 20 years have cast serious doubt on both its premises and its implications. For example, from a theoretical perspective, LeRoy (1973), Lucas (1978) and many others have shown in many ways and in many contexts that the Random Walk Hypothesis is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for rationally determined security prices. And empirically, numerous researchers have documented departures from the Random Walk Hypothesis in financial data. ^{3} Financial markets are predictable to some degree.

The rejection of the Random Walk Hypothesis opens the door to the possibility of superior long-term investment returns through disciplined, active investment management. In much the same way that inno-vations in biotechnology can garner superior returns for venture capitalists, innovations in financial technology can, in principle, garner superior returns for investors. This is com-pelling motivation for the application of artifi-cial intelligence in financial contexts.

**Artificial Neural Networks **

Recent advances in the theory and imple-mentation of (artificial) neural networks have captured the imagination and fancy of the financial community. ^{4} Although they are only one of the many types of statistical tools for modeling nonlinear relationships, neural net-works seem to be surrounded by a great deal of mystique and, sometimes, isunderstand-ing. Because they have their roots in neuro-physiology and the cognitive sciences, neural networks often are assumed to have brainlike qualities: learning capacity, problem-solving abilities and, ultimately, cognition and self-awareness. Alternatively, neural networks are often viewed as "black boxes" that can yield accurate predictions with little modeling effort.

In fact, neural networks are neither. They are an interesting and potentially powerful modeling technique in some, but surely not all, applications. To develop some basic intu-ition for neural networks, consider a typical nerve cell or "neuron." A neuron has dendrites (receptors) at different sites that react to stim-ulus. This stimulus is transmitted along the axon by an electrical pulse. If the electrical pulse exceeds some threshold level when it hits the nucleus, this triggers the nucleus to react, e.*g*., to make a particular muscle con-tract. This basic biological unit is what mathe-maticians attempt to capture in a neural net-work model. ^{5}

Even though neurobiologists have come to realize that actual nerve cells exhibit consider-ably more complex and subtle behavior, nev-ertheless AI researchers have found great use for the simple on/off or "binary threshold" model in approximating nonlinear relation-ships efficiently. In particular, neural network models have a very useful feature known as the "universal approximation property." This property means that with enough neurons linked together *in an appropriate wa*y, a neural network can approximate any nonlinear rela-tionship, no matter how strange.

Viewed as a statistical estimation technique, neural networks are a flexible model of nonlinearities. In this sense, they are just one of many techniques for modeling com-plex relationships. Examples of other nonlin-ear estimation techniques include: splines, wavelets, kernel regression, projection pur-suit, radial basis functions, nearest-neighbor estimators and, perhaps the most powerful of all, human intuition.

Even simple neural networks can cap-ture a variety of nonlinearities. Consider, for example, the sine function plus a random error term:

*Y **t *= Sin(*X **t *) + 0.5 *t *(1)e

where * *is a standard normal random vari-able. Can a neural network extract the sine function from observations *(X **t **,Y **t *)?

To answer this question, 500 *(X **t **,Y **t *) pairs were generated randomly, subject to the nonlinear relationship (3), and a neural net-work model was estimated using this artifi-cial data (or in the jargon of this literature, a neural network was trained on this data set).^{6}

The following equation is the result of train-ing a neural network on the data, using non-linear least squares:*Y **t *= 5.282 - 14.576 T (-1.472+1.86*9X **t *) -

5.411 (-2.628+0.64*2X **t *) -

3.071 (13.288-2.34*7X **t *) +

6.320 (-2.009+4.00*9X **t *) +

7.892 (-3.316+2.47*4X **t *)(2)

where T *(*x) is the logistic function 1/(1 + exp[x]). This network has five identical acti-vation functions T *(*x) (corresponding to the

five nodes in the hidden layer) and a con-stant term. The network has only two inputs, *X **t *and 1.

Now (2) looks nothing like the sine func-tion, so in what sense has the neural network "approximated" the nonlinear relation (1)? In Figure 1, the data points *(X **t **,Y **t *) are plotted as triangles, the dashed line is the theoretical relation to be estimated (the sine function), and the solid line is the relation as estimated by the neural network (2). The solid line is impressively close to the dashed line, despite the noise that the data clearly contain. Therefore, although the functional form of (2) does not resemble any trigonometric function, its numerical values do. Add more data points, and it would likely get even closer.

Hutchinson, Lo and Poggio (1994) pro-posed neural network models for estimating derivative pricing formulas. In particular, they take as inputs the primary economic variables that influence the derivative's price- current underlying asset price, strike price, time-to-maturity, etc.-and define the derivative price to be the output into which the neural network maps the inputs. When properly trained, the network "becomes" the derivative pricing formula, which may be used in the same way that formulas obtained from parametric pricing methods such as the well-known Black-Scholes formula are used: for pricing, delta-hedging, simulation exercises, etc.

These neural network models have several important advantages over the more tradi-tional parametric models. First, since they do not rely on restrictive parametric assump-tions such as lognormality or sample-path continuity, they are robust to the specifica-tion errors that plague parametric models. (In other words, you don't have to worry about having the right assumptions if you don't have to make any assumptions). Second, they are adaptive and respond to structural changes in the data-generating processes in ways that parametric models cannot. Third, they are flexible enough to encompass a wide range of derivative secu-rities and fundamental asset-price dynam-ics, yet relatively simple to implement. And finally, they are easily parallelizable and may be computationally more efficient.

Of course, all these advantages do not come without some cost-the nonparamet-ric pricing method is highly data-intensive, requiring large quantities of historical prices to obtain a sufficiently well-trained network. Therefore, such an approach would be inap-propriate for thinly traded derivatives or newly created derivatives that have no simi-lar counterparts among existing securities. ^{7}

Also, if the fundamental asset's price dynamics are well-understood and an ana-lytical expression for the derivative's price is available under these dynamics, then the parametric formula almost always will out-perform the network formula in pricing and hedging accuracy. Nevertheless, these con-ditions occur rarely enough that there may still be great practical value in constructing derivative pricing formulas by learning net-works. To illustrate the practical relevance of their approach, Hutchinson, Lo and Poggio (1994) apply it to the pricing and delta-hedg-ing of S&P 500 futures options from 1987 to 1992. They show that neural network models perform well, yielding delta-hedging errors and option prices that are comparable to, and in some cases, better than traditional methods like Black-Scholes.

**Data Mining And Data Snooping**

A substantial portion of the recent litera-ture in artificial intelligence is devoted to a discipline now known as "data mining" or "knowledge discovery in databases" (KDD). The combination of very large scale data-bases in many research and business con-texts and the tremendous growth in comput-ing power over the past several decades has naturally led to the development of computationally intensive methods for systematically sifting through large quantities of data.

In fact, Internet-based search engines are perhaps the most common examples of data-mining applications, and there are many other prominent examples in market-ing, financial services, telecommunications and molecular biology. Perhaps the most challenging issue facing data miners today is a statistical one: how to determine whether the results from a data-mining search are genuine or spurious? For example, suppose we search a database of mutual funds to find the one with the most successful track record over the past five years, and the process yields XYZ Growth Fund. Does this imply that XYZ is a good fund, or is it possi-ble that XYZ's performance is a fluke?

In searching for the presence of any effect, whether it is superior investment per-formance or a causal relationship between two characteristics, the dilemma will always be present: If the effect exists, data-mining algorithms will generally detect it; if the effect does not exist, data-mining algorithms usu-ally still will find an "effect" anyway. The lat-ter case is known as a "data-snooping bias." The problem is in being aware of the kind of result you have.

To see how serious a problem this dilem-ma can be, suppose we have a collection of *n *mutual funds with (random) annual returns *R *1 , *R *2 , … *R *n respectively that are mutually independent and have the same probability distribution function *F **R **(*r).^{8}That is, they have nothing to do with each other.

Now, for concreteness, suppose that these returns normally are distributed with an expected value of 10% per year and a standard deviation of 20% per year, roughly comparable to the historical behavior of the S&P 500. Under these assumptions, what is the probability that the return on fund *i *exceeds 50%? Because the distribution is normal, we know the probability in any given year is about 2.3%:

Prob(*R *> 0.50) = 1 - Prob(*R *=0.50) = 0.0228 . (3)

But suppose we focus not on any arbi-trary fund i, but rather on the fund that has the largest return among all *n *funds. Although we do not know in advance which fund this will be, nevertheless, we can char-acterize this best-performing fund in the abstract, in much the same way that college admissions offices can construct the profiles of the applicants with the highest standard-ized test scores. However, this analogy is not completely accurate because on aver-age, test scores do seem to bear some rela-tion to subsequent academic performance. In our n-fund example, even though there will always be a "best-performing" fund or "winner," the *subsequent *performance of this winner will be statistically identical to all the other funds by assumption, i.e., the same expected return, the same volatility and the same probability law.

This distinction is the essence of the data-snooping problem. There will always be a winner. The question is: Does winning tell us anything about the true nature of the winner? In the case of standardized test scores, the generally accepted answer is yes. In the case of the *n *independently and identically distributed mutual funds, the answer is no. The larger the sample, the larger (and there-fore perhaps more tempting and hard to ignore) the largest score is likely to be.

To quantify this effect, we can derive the probability law of the return *R* *of the "best-performing" fund:

*R* *= Max [ *R *1 , *R *2 ,…, *R *n ] (4)

which is given by the following distribution function:

*F **R* *(r) = *[F **R **(*r)]*n *.(5)

After data snooping, the probability of observing performance greater than 50% is given by:

Prob(R* > 0.50) = 1 - Prob(R* =0.50) = 1 - *[F **R **(*r)]*n *= 1 - (0.9772)*n *.(6)

When n=1, the probability that R* exceeds 50% is the same as the probability that *R *exceeds 50%: 2.3%. But among a sample of *n *=100 securities, the probability that R* exceeds 50% is 1 - (0.9772)100 or 90%! Not surprisingly, the probability that the *largest *of 100 independent returns exceeds 50% is considerably greater than the proba-bility that any individual fund's return exceeds 50%. However, this has no bearing on future returns since we have assumed that all *n *funds have the same mean and variance, and they are statistically independ-ent of each other.

How are the properties of R* related to data-snooping biases in financial analysis? Investors often focus on past performance as a guide to future performance, associating past successes with significant investment skills. But if superior performance is the unavoidable result of the selection procedure- picking the strategy or manager with the most successful track record, for example- then past performance is not necessarily an accurate indicator of future performance.

In other words, the selection procedure may bias our perception of performance, causing us to attribute superior performance to an investment strategy or manager that was merely "lucky."

There are statistical procedures that can partially offset the most obvious types of data-snooping biases,^{9} but the final arbiter must inevitably be the end-user of the data-mining algorithm. By trading off the cost of one type of error (detecting effects that do not exist) with the other (not detecting effects that do exist), a sensible balance between data mining and data snooping needs to be struck. ^{10} The necessity of at least some human intervention at the decision-making point may yet prove to be an insurmountable limitation of artificial intelligence.

**Pattern Recognition**

One of the biggest rifts that divides aca-demic finance and industry practice is the separation between technical analysts and their academic critics. In contrast to funda-mental analysis, which was quick to be adopted by the scholars of modern quanti-tative finance, technical analysis has been an orphan from the very start. In some cir-cles, technical analysis is known as "voodoo finance." In his influential book *A Random **Walk Down Wall Stree*t, Burton Malkiel (1996) concludes that "[u]nder scientific scrutiny, chart-reading must share a pedestal with alchemy."

One explanation for this state of contro-versy and confusion is the unique and some-times impenetrable jargon used by technical analysts. Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, pp. 43-44) provide a striking example of the linguistic barriers between technical analysts and academic finance by contrast-ing these two statements:

*The presence of clearly identified support **and resistance levels, coupled with a one-third **retracement parameter when prices lie **between them, suggests the presence of **strong buying and selling opportunities in **the near-term. **The magnitudes and decay pattern of the first **12 autocorrelations and the statistical signif-icance **of the Box-Pierce Q-sta-tistic **suggest the presence of a **high-frequency predictable **component in stock returns. *

Despite the fact that both statements have the same basic meaning-that past prices contain information for predicting future returns- most academics find the first statement puzzling and the second lausible.

These linguistic barriers underscore an important difference: Technical analysis is primarily visual, while quantitative finance is primarily algebraic and numerical. Technical analysis employs the tools of geometry and pattern recognition, while quantitative finance employs the tools of mathematical analysis and probability and statistics. In the wake of recent breakthroughs in financial engineering, computer technology and numerical algorithms, it is no wonder that quantitative finance has overtaken technical analysis in popularity. The principles of port-folio optimization are far easier to program into a computer than the basic tenets of technical analysis.

Nevertheless, technical analysis has sur-vived, perhaps because its visual mode of analysis is more conducive to human cogni-tion, and because pattern recognition is one of the few repetitive activities for which com-puters do not have an absolute advantage (yet). However, this is changing. Artificial intelligence has made admirable progress in the automation of pattern detection, hence the possibility of automating technical analy-sis is becoming a reality. In particular, Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2000) have proposed an algorithm for detecting technical indica-tors such as "head-and-shoulders" and "double bottoms," and have applied it to the daily prices of several hundred U.S. stocks over a 30-year period to evaluate the infor-mation content of such patterns.

This process is motivated by the general goal of technical analysis, which is to identify regularities in the time series of prices by extracting nonlinear patterns from noisy data. Implicit in this goal is the recognition that some price movements are significant-they contribute to the formation of a specific pat-tern- and others are merely random fluctua-tions to be ignored. In many cases, the human eye can perform this "signal extraction" quick-ly and accurately, and until recently, computer algorithms could not.

However, "smoothing" estimators such as kernel regression are ideally suited to this task because they extract nonlinear relations by "averaging out" the noise. Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2000) use these estimators to mimic, and in some cases sharpen, the skills of a trained technical analyst in identifying certain patterns in historical price series.

Armed with a mathematical representa-tion of the time series of historical prices from which geometric properties can be characterized in an objective manner, they construct an algorithm for automating the detection of technical patterns consisting of three steps:

- Define each technical pattern in terms of its geometric properties, e.g., local extrema (maxima and minima) so that algorithms for identifying its occurrence can be developed.
- Construct a kernel-regression estimator of a given time series of prices so that its extrema can be determined numerically.
- Analyze the fitted curve of this esti-mator for occurrences of each technical pattern.

The first step is the most challenging because this is the heart of the pattern-recognition algorithm and where much of the creativity of human technical analysts comes into play. For example, note that only five consecutive extrema are required to identify a head-and-shoulders pattern (although its completion requires two more, where it initially and finally crosses the "neckline"). This follows from the for-malization of the geometry of a head-and- shoulders pattern: three peaks, with the middle peak higher than the other two. Because consecutive extrema must alter-nate between maxima and minima for smooth functions, ^{11} the three-peaks pat-tern corresponds to a sequence of five local extrema: maximum, minimum, high-est maximum, minimum and maximum.

Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2000) define nine other technical patterns in similar fashion, and once they have been given mathematical precision in this way, the detection of these patterns can be readily automated. An illustration of their algorithm at work is given in Figure 2. When they apply their algorithm to daily prices of more than 300 U.S. stocks from 1962 to 1996, they find that certain technical indica-tors do provide incremental information and that technical indicators tend to be more informative for NASDAQ stocks than for NYSE or AMEX stocks.

While pattern-recognition techniques have been successful in automating a number of tasks that previously were con-sidered to be uniquely human endeav-ors- fingerprint identification, handwriting analysis, and face recognition, for exam-ple- nevertheless, it is possible that no machine algorithm is a perfect substitute for the skills of an experienced technical analyst. However, if an algorithm can pro-vide a reasonable approximation of *some *cognitive abilities of a human analyst, such an algorithm can be used to leverage the skills of any technician. Moreover, if techni-cal analysis is an art form that can be taught, then surely its basic precepts can be quantified and automated to some degree. And as increasingly sophisticated pattern-recognition techniques are devel-oped, a larger fraction of the art will become a science.

**Conclusions**

In this article, I have only scratched the surface of the many applications of artifi-cial intelligence that will be transforming financial technology over the next few years. Other emerging technologies include artificial markets and agent-based models of financial transactions, electronic market-making, modeling emotional responses as computational algorithms ("affective computing"), the psychophysi- ology of risk preferences, and financial visualization. Artificial intelligence undoubtedly will play a more central role in active investment management, but this does not imply that indexation will become less relevant for investors.

Artificial intelligence and active management are not at odds with indexation, but instead imply the evolution of a more sophisticated set of indexes and portfolio management policies for the typical investor, something investors can look forward to, perhaps within the next decade. Imagine a software program that constructs a cus-tom- designed index for each investor according to his or her risk preferences, financial objectives, insurance needs, retirement plans, tax bracket, etc. This "SmartIndex" will serve to guide each investor toward a path of long-term finan-cial security-a path that is unique to each investor-so that if an investor's portfolio return differs by more than a certain margin from the return of his or her SmartIndex, this will serve as an "early-warning signal" to change the investment policy to get back on track. Whether or not an investor's portfolio outperforms the S&P 500 in any given year will not be as relevant as whether it outperforms the investor's SmartIndex, hence, such an innovation will change the very nature of indexation and the role of index funds and benchmark returns. This concept may well be science fiction today, but the technology for SmartIndexes already exists. As with the transformation of all great ideas from theory into practice, it is only a matter of time.

**References**

Ait-Sahalia, Y. and A. Lo, 1998, " Nonparametric Estimation of State-Price Densities Implicit In Financial Asset Prices," *Journal **of Finance *52, 499-548.

Campbell, J., Lo, A., and C. MacKinlay, 1997, *The Econometrics of Financial Market*s. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hald, A., 1990, *A History of Probability and Statistics and Their Applications Before 175*0. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Hertz, J., A. Krogh, and R. Palmer, 1991, *Introduction to the Theory of Neural Computatio*n. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Hamilton, W., 1922, *The Stock Market Baromete*r. New York: Harper and Row (republished in 1998 by John Wiley & Sons).

Hutchinson, J., Lo, A., and T. Poggio, 1994, " A Nonparametric Approach to Pricing and Hedging Derivative Securities via

Learning Networks," *Journal of Finance *49, 851-889.

Iyengar, S. and J. Greenhouse, 1988, " Selection Models and the File Drawer Problem," *Statistical Science *3, 109-135.

Jin, L. and A. Lo, 2001, "How Anomalous Are Financial Anomalies?" Unpublished working paper, MIT Sloan School of Management.

Leamer, E., 1978, *Specification Searche*s. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

LeRoy, S., 1973, "Risk Aversion and the Martingale Property of Stock Returns," *International Economic Review *14, 436-446.

Lo, A., 1994a, " Neural Networks and Other Nonparametric Techniques in Economics and Finance," in H. Russell Fogler, ed.: *Blending Quantitative and Traditional Equity Analysi*s. Charlottesville, VA: Association for Investment Management and Research.

Lo, A., 1994b, " Data-Snooping Biases in Financial Analysis," in H. Russell Fogler, ed.: *Blending Quantitative and Traditional **Equity Analysi*s. Charlottesville, VA: Association for Investment Management and Research.

Lo, A. and C. MacKinlay, 1990, "Data Snooping Biases in Tests of Financial Asset Pricing Models," *Review of Financial Studies *3, 431-468.

Lo, A. and C. MacKinlay, 1999, *A Non-Random Walk Down Wall Stree*t. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lo, A., Mamaysky, H., and J. Wang, 2000, "Foundations of Technical Analysis: Computational Algorithms, Statistical Inference, and Empirical Implementation," *Journal of Finance *55, 1705-1765.

Lucas, R., 1978, " Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy," *Econometrica *46, 1429-1446.

Malkiel, B., 1996, *A Random Walk Down Wall Stree*t. New York: W.W. Norton.

Samuelson, P., 1965, "Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly," *Industrial Management Review *6, 41-49.

White, H., 1992, *Artificial Neural Networks: Approximation and Learning Theor*y. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

**Footnotes**

- See Hamilton (1922) for a thorough exposition of the Dow Theory.
- See, for example, Hald (1990, Chapter 4).
- See, for example, Lo and MacKinlay (1988, 1999).
- The adjective " artificial" often is used to distinguish mathematical models of neural networks from their biological counter-parts. For brevity, I shall omit this qualifier for the remainder of this article although it will be implicit in all of my references to neural networks.
- Since this is meant to be an overview, I will not hesitate to sacrifice rigor for clarity. A more extensive overview is given in Lo (1994). More mathematically inclined readers are encouraged to consult Hertz, Krogh, and Palmer (1991) for the general the-ory of neural computation, White (1992) for the statistics of neural networks, and Ait-Sahalia and Lo (1994) and Hutchinson, Lo and Poggio (1994) for financial applications.
- Specifically, the particular neural network is a "single hidden-layer feedforward perceptron" with five nodes. As of yet, there are no formal rules for selecting the optimal configuration or "topology" of a neural network, and this is one of the primary drawbacks of neural network models. Currently, experience and heuristics are the only guides we have for specifying the net-work topology.
- However, since newly created derivative securities often can be replicated by a combination of existing derivatives, this is not as much of a limitation as it may seem at first.
- Recall that the distribution function
*F**R**(*r) of a random variable R is defined as*F**R**(*r) = Prob(*R <*r). - See, for example, Leamer (1978), Iyengar and Greenhouse (1988), Lo and MacKinlay (1990), and Lo (1994).
- See Jin and Lo (2001) for an example of this kind of analysis in a financial context.
- After all, for two consecutive maxima to be local maxima, there must be a local minumum in between and vice versa for two consecutive minima.