How ETF Structure Comes Through In A Crisis

July 31, 2014

Set the way-back machine for the end of 2008. The market for corporate bonds had pretty much dried up, and by the end of November, the flagship ETF—the iShares iBoxx $ High Yield Corporate Bond ETF (HYG | B-69)—was down more than 30 percent.

And then everyone wanted to get back in for the end-of-year rally, as it looked like the world might not end. Investor demand for HYG skyrocketed, and over the course of a few weeks, billions flowed in.

But there was a problem. While everyone had continued to trade ETFs, it was actually nearly impossible to buy and sell corporate bonds. Bond desks were reducing inventory, and nobody really knew what the fair price of any junk bond should be.

So while investors wanted more HYG, APs really had no idea how to effectively arbitrage. After all, how were they going to go buy a basket of junk bonds to deliver to iShares? What happened was predictable:

2_HYGPD

Chart courtesy of Bloomberg

APs simply sat on the sidelines. And while they sat on the sidelines, the price of HYG skyrocketed. Eventually the premium became so large that APs finally stepped in and started scrambling to make creations happen.

But it’s important to point out that the AP is never under an obligation to do this. They have rules they have to follow in terms of how they do creations and redemptions, but there’s never an instance where a gun is held to their heads and they “must” do a creation or redemption. They’re in business to make money just like everyone else, after all, and if they don’t believe market conditions will let them book a profit, they’ll do just what you’d do—they’ll sit out and wait.

The net effect, however, is interesting for long-term investors. Consider who “overpaid” for their shares of HYG in this scenario—the trader trying to get new money to work. If you were a long-term holder of the ETF, you could sit there waiting for the price of the net asset value (NAV) of the ETF to “catch up” to the realized prices the AP had to pay for the underlying bonds.

In other words, the act of the AP going out there and buying the bonds informs the fair value of the ETF, but until “someone” buys the illiquid bonds, the NAV is really just a best-guess pricing service.

You can see on the chart the opposite thing happening in October 2008—and this is the exact scenario posited by our reader’s question. In October 2008, HYG traded to a near 8 percent discount.

Again, who was “underpaid” for their desire to get out? The guy who hit the panic button and sold in a hurry. The APs didn’t think they could sell the basket of illiquid bonds they’d need to get in a redemption, so they didn’t even bother (note the lack of any outflows). They just let it trade to a discount, and then recover. They didn’t “refuse” a basket, per se—they simply chose not to participate that day.

Imagine what would have happened if that same investor had wanted to sell her mirror-image mutual fund? She would have submitted a sale order to her mutual fund, received NAV and then the portfolio manager would have had to go out into the market and raise money. They would have had to fire-sale those same illiquid bonds, locking in bad prices to the detriment of the entire fund’s NAV.

That’s why I so often say that even in poorly trading ETFs, the structure is generally “fairer” than an equivalent mutual fund. The trading costs of wanting in and out of illiquid securities are borne by the traders, while buy-and-hold investors keep on keepin’ on.


At the time this article was written, the author held no positions in the securities mentioned. Contact Dave Nadig at [email protected].

 

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